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THE PERVASIVE MYTH OF PERVASIVE
DISCOVERY ABUSE: THE SEQUEL
LINDA S. MULLENIX *
As the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Advisory Committee"
or "Committee") once again contemplates revision to the federal civil
discovery rules, it is encouraging that the Advisory Committee this time
around has commissioned empirical research in advance of possible
rulemaking. With that research in hand, three findings are striking in
these RAND and Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") studies.
First, the constancy of the data relating to civil discovery is impres-
sive. Second, the studies reaffirm our common sense notions about
discovery—that complex, high-stakes litigation, handled by big firms
with corporate clients, are the cases most likely to involve the problem-
atic discovery that skews the discovery debate. Third, there is at best
ambiguous evidence concerning the efficacy of mandatory disclosure
in courts that have voluntarily adopted the rule.
These comments briefly explore the import of the RAND and FJC
data for further amendment of the federal discovery rules. As with all
proposed rule revision, the Advisory Committee ought to be protective
of its rule-making role, given its shared authority with Congress. Thus,
prudence counsels against rule amendment unless reform is necessary
to fix a problem. Rulemakers ought first to ask, "is there a problem?"
If so, they ought next to ask, "can a rule amendment fix it? Will it make
things better?" And—in an unanswerable conundrum—rulernakers
ought to ask if it is possible to anticipate any unintended consequences
of their rule reform.
* * *
Obviously, there is a wealth of statistical information in the new
RAND and FJC empirical studies, providing a kind of inkblot Ror-
schach-test for rule revisionists. Hence, proponents and opponents of
further discovery reform will mine these studies to support whatever
conclusions they wish to advance, and selective interpretation of the
data will accomplish many ends. Nonetheless, these studies suggest-
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from the broadest neutral perspective—that discovery data have re-
mained surprisingly constant over time.
As the FJC and RAND studies point out, proposals for discovery
reform repeatedly have resurfaced during the last fifty years, typically
impelled by anecdotal evidence and rhetorical, but highly compelling,
reports of discovery abuse) During this time, however, there have been
few empirical studies. Some of these projects have been objective
analyses of discovery events, such as those conducted by the FJC in the
1970s and 1980s, 2 the Civil Litigation Research Project in 1983 3 and
the state-based discovery study conducted by the National Center for
State Courts in the early 1990s.4
 On the other hand, more prominently
reported "studies" have consisted of subjective inquiries asking lawyers
and judges for their impressions of discovery practice—the Harris
surveys of the late 1980s, which are little more than anecdotal evidence
gussied-up in pseudo-scientific garb. 5
At any rate, over a twenty-year span of empirical research in fed-
eral and state courts, using different databases in different local legal
cultures, both before and after the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
("CJRA") and the 1993 discovery rule reforms, the essential statistics
relating to discovery have remained remarkably the same.
The following statistics have remained true, no matter how much
or in what manner the rulemakers have tinkered with the rules. First,
there is no discovery in anywhere from 38% (RAND) to approximately
50% (FJC) of civil cases. No discovery. The RAND data here is espe-
cially interesting. For fully half of their survey cases—cases that "close"
within nine months—the median time lawyers report spending on
discovery is only three hours. Undoubtedly, most lawyers who work on
big case litigation will find these numbers to be absolutely stupefying.
Clearly, these numbers are disorienting or disconcerting because
they subvert advocacy efforts to vilify current discovery rules and prac-
tice by means of the horrible anecdote. Hence, these numbers are
startling for those who choose to see the glass half-empty and who focus
I See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth' of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994).
2 See, e.g., PAUL CONNOLLY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES (1980).
3 See generally David M. Trubek cl al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72
(1983).
4
 See generally Susan Kcilitz et al., Attorneys' Views of Civil Discovery, JUDGES' J., Spring 1993,
at 2; Susan Kcilitz et al., is Civil Discovery in Slate Thal Courts Out of Control?, STATE CT, J., Spring
1993, at 8.
5 See Mullcnix, supra note 1, at 1410-15 (describing and criticizing the Harris surveys).
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on the bad news about American over-litigiousness. The fact remains,
however, that there still is a lot of civil litigation where there is not a
lot of discovery, or no discovery at all.
Moreover, it is still true that, in the remaining universe of cases in
which discovery occurs, there are few discovery "events." As RAND
reports: "Overall, lawyer work hours per litigant on discovery . . . [are]
low for the majority of cases." 6 Also constant over time is the RAND
finding, congruent with all past studies, including the FJC studies, that:
"Discovery is not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority of
cases,
31
Also unchanging is the RAND finding, congruent with all past
studies, including the FJC studies, that: "The empirical data show that
any problems that may exist with discovery are concentrated in the
minority of cases." And RAND further finds: "It is the minority of the
cases with high discovery costs that generate [s] the anecdotal 'parade
of horribles' that dominates much of the debate over discovery rules
and discovery case management."9
Without belaboring these points, it seems legitimate then to ques-
tion why the rule reformers again are considering universal discovery
reform when there continues to be no universal discovery problem.
For more than twenty years, in a variety of bean-counting studies
conducted by different organizations, the data keep telling us that if
there are problems with discovery—and what constitutes "problematic
discovery" is itself highly questionable—this phenomenon occurs only in
a small segment of the litigation landscape.
These data also suggest that perhaps scholars have been studying
the wrong phenomenon; maybe more effort should be devoted to
studying those cases that are resolved with little or no discovery at all.
What can these attorneys teach us about resolving disputes through
cooperative lawyering, or without recourse to extensive use and abuse
of the discovery process?
Seconii, the studies reaffirm common sense notions about discov-
ery: that complex, high stakes litigation, handled by big firms with
corporate clients, are the cases most likely to involve the kind of
problematic discovery that skews the discovery debate. As the FJC
concludes: "Both the likelihood of problems and the total incidence
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FUR-
THER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA § II(A) (1998), reprinted
in 39 B.C. L REV. 613 (1998) (in this issue) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
7 Id.
8 Id.
3 Id.
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of problems increased as stakes, factual complexity, and contentious-
ness increased." It further concludes that problems in these cases
were not limited to a particular procedural area, such as disclosure or
document production, but occurred in most or all aspects of discov-
ery. 11
The RAND study deviates somewhat, to the extent that it con-
cludes that complex cases are more likely to consume higher median
lawyer work hours—including more hours devoted to discovery—but
that the overall percentage of time devoted to discovery is no different
than other cases." There's just more of it."
What are the rulemakers to do with these findings? Just as the data
have remained relatively constant, most of its interpreters consistently
have counseled that targeted problems call for targeted responses. If
complex litigation is the source of more problematic discovery prac-
tice, then rule reform ought to be tailored to the universe of this
particular litigation that inspires complaint. But here, again, the RAND
study rightly notes that existing rules already provide means for regu-
lating, conducting and controlling discovery in complex litigation"—
so the rulemakers ought to give some pause before adding yet new
rules to existing rules supposedly designed to deal with complex cases.
Third, because the Advisory Committee in 1993 chose to promul-
gate the first "opt-out" rule of civil procedure, the Committee now is
in the awkward position of having to decide whether to universalize
Rule 26(a) (1) concerning mandatory disclosure. The FJC findings
conclude that the initial disclosure rule is being widely used and
working as intended 15 and that there is a strong trend among attorneys
favoring adoption of a uniform federal rule that requires initial disclo-
sure." But the FJC study also reveals that more than half of the survey
respondents either disfavor a mandatory initial disclosure rule or de-
sire maintaining the status quo that now allows district courts to opt-
out."
The RAND study also is less sanguine about the efficacy of the
1993 mandatory disclosure provision. Hence, the RAND study con-
10 Thornas E. Willging et al., Federal Judicial Ctr., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice tinder the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 532 (1998) (in
this issue) [hereinafter FJC Study].
It see id.
12 See RAND REPORT, supra note 6, § 11(C).
"Id.
11
 See id. § I(G)(4).
15 See FJC Study, supra note 10, at 534.
is
	
id.
17 See id. at 588.
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eludes that mandatory early disclosure is not "associated with [either]
significantly reduced lawyer work hours . . [or] with significantly
reduced time to disposition."I 8 The RAND study also has found that
highly "managed" cases that are supervised through early case man-
agement under CJRA requirements paradoxically have a higher likeli-
hood of more lawyer hours being spent on discovery.i 8
It should be kept in mind that the FJC and RAND projects inves-
tigated the mandatory disclosure rule as it has been developed and
used in two different time periods. Thus, RAND studied the use of this
procedure in federal courts under the authority of CJRA plans, begin-
ning in 1991, while the FJC studied the use of the rule after the 1993
federal rule amendment. Nonetheless, the studies do seem to suggest
ambiguous reactions to the mandatory disclosure provision, and the
heated controversy that accompanied its initial proposal remained
through 1997.
Thus, at this juncture, and in light of such ambiguous data con-
cerning the initial disclosure rule, the Advisory Committee probably
should do that which is hardest to do: nothing. Because, however, the
Advisory Committee is loath to leave the federal judiciary with a patch-
work of early disclosure provisions, it seems highly likely that the
Committee will proceed with promulgating some version of a universal
disclosure provision.
* * *
In assessing these empirical studies, it seems equally important to
comment on what was not studied and who was not surveyed. Although
it is important to go forward with reform proposals against a backdrop
of factual information, it seems equally important not to go forward
with rule reform when the empiricists have studied one phenomenott 2°
but the Advisory Committee is considering completely different rule
revisions. 2 '
I° RAND REPORT, WPM note 6, § II (C.) (1)–(2).
1;V
	 id. § II (B)(1).
20 I make the following comments guardedly—and not critically of either the FJC nor the
RAND Institute, 1 understand that the Advisory Committee gave both organizations specific
directions concerning the nature and scope of their tasks in this project, and both have per-
formed exemplary work using their access to very large databases. Both were asked to assess the
effects either of the CJRA and/or 1993 discovery rule changes on practice in the federal courts.
Specifically, they were not asked to ascertain views on possible, additional new proposed rule
amendments.
21 For example, the various proposals to change the definition of the scope of discovery.
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Thus, the rulemakers still do not have a working definition of what
constitutes appropriate discovery and, by implication, what constitutes
discovery abuse, apart from attorneys' and judges' subjective opinions.
As RAND restates this question: There "has been [a] failure of reform-
ers to carefully identify the problem they are seeking to remedy and
the sources of that problem."" Moreover, the academicians, critics and
rulemakers also have failed to identify the sources of these problems
that have not been defined. As RAND quite accurately notes: "Under-
standing the source of the problems is important because without such
an understanding reformers run the risk that the fixes they choose will
be ineffective."25
Additionally, these empirical studies have failed to investigate the
need for proposed rule reforms that have been circulated among
Advisory Committee members and interested participants since last
year and are now on the Committee's agenda. 21 In recent years there
have been several calls for the Advisory Committee to conduct empiri-
cal research prior to consideration and promulgation of rule revi-
sions.25
Thus, it is rather ironic that the Advisory Committee has now
conducted empirical studies after-the-fact of their 1993 rule reform to
assess the impact of the implemented rule changes (such as Rule
26(a) (1)) but did not do so prior to promulgating the rule revisions.
And, the Advisory Committee now seems poised on the verge of re-
peating this history.
These studies also did not investigate, or chose not to investigate,
the central theoretical attack against the early mandatory disclosure
requirements. That challenge was based on the prediction that the
mandatory disclosure requirements would compromise the adversarial
litigation process, compromise the attorney-client relationship, impair
the attorney-client privilege, impair the attorney work product and
subvert the attorney's duty of zealous representation. 26
2R RAND REPORT, supra note 6, § 1(H) (citing to numerous examples of this failure).
23 Id.
24 See Memorandum from Richard L. Marcus, Special Reporter, Discovery Subcommittee to
Participants in Conference on Discovery of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (June 2,
1997) (describing proposals for changing discovery rules, such as narrowing the scope of discov-
ery, reducing the burden of document discovery, etc.) (on file with the Boston College Law
Review).
25 See generally, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 1; Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A
Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, Law & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
26 See generally, Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush To Reform,
27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992). Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Adversarial justice, Professional Responsibility, and
the New Federal Discovery Rules, 14 REV. LITIC. 13 (1994).
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In light of the centrality of that challenge to our underlying
jurisprudence of pleading and discovery, it might have been useful to
learn whether the recently promulgated discovery reforms have indeed
affected the way in which lawyers conduct their practices.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to get excited about rule reform when the data
suggest that the best prudential course is to do nothing. Inevitably,
however, the Advisory Committee will proceed with another round of
discovery reform, for at least two reasons.
First, the Advisory Committee precipitated a dilemma of its own
making (i.e., the Committee shot itself in the proverbial foot) when it
created the first-ever opt-out federal rule in 1993. Having thus balkan-
ized procedure, the Advisory Committee now feels compelled to fix
the Rule 26(a) (1) opt-out rule in the interests of preserving the pri-
mary value underlying the civil procedure rules: federal uniformity.
And, having precipitated its own crisis of disuniformity, the Com-
mittee thereby engendered the problem of determining the content
of the uniform rule. Hence, the original combatants in the discovery
wars will now replay the same debate surrounding the mandatory
disclosure provisions. Ironically, both sides will deploy this new after-
the-fact empirical data to support and attack the efficacy of Rule
26(a) (1). The combatants will fight to a draw, and the Advisory Com-
mittee will universalize Rule 26(a) (1).
Finally, the Advisory Committee will further amend the discovery
rules—even if this is neither necessary nor desirable—because it is in
the nature of bureaucracy that committees, once called into existence,
do something. Max Weber probably said that, someplace.
